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DUTY AND BREACH IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY:
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR FAILURE
TO ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Maxine Burkett*
INTRODUCTION
In Litigating Climate Change Adaptation,' I argued that despite a gen-
eral skepticism about tort law's ability to tackle climate change there is an
important role for this quite powerful branch of common law.2 Claimants
can seek compensation for harms incurred because of the negligent acts of
local governments and developers vis-A-vis climate preparedness, or lack
thereofI The article argued that increased threat of liability as well as the
possibility of growing success in the courts would galvanize more rigorous
adaptation4 and mitigation efforts at all scales.' Though an indirect benefit,
adaptation litigation could be a purposeful use of tort's deterrence and be-
havior-changing potential.' That article did not, however, address the im-
portant and more challenging questions related to the nature and scope of
the duty to which local governments would now have to adhere. Further, it
did not tackle the possibility of more expansive duty obligations, which
public policy may well demand in light of accelerated climate change. This
Article attempts to do just that by exploring (1) reasonable conduct under
climate-change circumstances and (2) the emergence of new obligations "to
which the law will give recognition and effect."7
* Associate Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i. I
thank Mahina Tuteur for excellent research assistance.
1 Maxine Burkett, Litigating Climate Change Adaptation: Theory, Practice, and Corrective
(Climate) Justice, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11144 (2012).
2 Id. at 11149.
3 The negligence query would be as follows: "Has x defendant acted reasonably in light of the
known risks of climate change when acting or failing to act, thus causing plaintiffs alleged harm?" Id.
4 "Adaptation is the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities." Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change, Introduction to the Working Group H Fourth Assessment Report,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 6 (Martin Parry et al. eds.,
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications and data/publications ipcc fourthassessment_
report wg2_report impacts adaptation and vulnerability.htm.
5 Burkett, supra note 1, at 11146-47.
6 ld. at 11147.
7 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 356 (5th ed.
1984).
GEo. MASON L. REV.
With each year marked by relentless extremes-mild winters punctu-
ated with wild blizzards followed by choking heat waves, late season wild-
fires, and devastating storms--even the previously "climate indifferent"9
will wonder why more reasonable action in response to the threat of climate
change was not pursued actively by those who had the knowledge of its
potential impacts and had the capacity to plan in light of them. Local gov-
ernments and developers are two of the viable defendants as they determine
much of what occurs at the coastline or in "red zones."'" Developers' duty
obligations and reasonable conduct are a bit more straightforward than
those of local governments, and other scholars have explored them else-
where, though under distinct but related circumstances." Future claimants
might, however, subject local governments to numerous claims regarding
infrastructure and property impacts using a climate-change adaptation
frame. 2 Inadequate adaptation planning and even poorly conceived adapta-
tion policies might cause damage to property owners, thus exposing local
governments to extensive liability. The claims for repair, reconstruction,
and compensation by property owners subject to the negligent acts of others
would not be "exotic" claims, 3 like those of the "carbon tort."' 4 The associ-
ated issues of duty and breach in claims against local governments, howev-
er, are more exotic.
The most difficult issues adaptation litigation raises are the antecedent
ones: How do you define a duty with which potential defendants must com-
ply and identify the actions that reasonable governments might take to dis-
charge that duty? There are duties that are "easier" to define and meet. For
example, if a local government builds infrastructure in the coastal zone it
8 Richard Somerville & Jeff Masters, Summer of Extremes: Roundup of U.S. Records, CLIMATE
COMM. (Sept. 25, 2012), http://climatecommunication.org/new/articles/summer-of-extremes/overview.
9 1 use "climate indifferent" to describe those that are neither climate hawks nor climate deniers.
They have not considered climate-change a pressing issue, regardless of their ideological bent. See
Thomas Kaplan, Most New Yorkers Think Climate Change Caused Hurricane, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/nyregion/most-new-yorkers-tie-hurricane-sandy-
to-climate-change-poll-finds.html.
10 Red zones are areas where the "most unhealthy and flammable forests threaten dense develop-
ments or other resources." Michael Kodas, Life on the Edge (of Wildfire), ONEARTH MAGAZINE (Aug.
7, 2012), http://www.onearth.org/print/22101. Other viable defendants include real estate brokers,
engineers, architects, and infrastructure owners, to name a few.
11 See, e.g., Jeffrey Piampiano, Comment, Coastal Erosion and the Risk of Liability for Coastal
Land Developers, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 347, 365 (2000).
12 See Burkett, supra note 1, at 11148 ("[L]osses to the integrity of property or the physical body
are the clearest case for duty of repair and corrective justice and are especially present in the climate
adaptation context.").
13 See Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 4, 68
(2011) (stating that by forcing courts to confront questions of harm, causation, and responsibility that lie
at the frontiers of science and ethics, climate change lawsuits hold the potential to move the bar for what
counts as "exotic" in the domain of tort).
14 See Burkett, supra note 1, at 11144.
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must do so well enough to withstand reasonably anticipated risks. In the
climate context, however, there are many "tougher" duty- and breach-
related questions: What is a reasonable timeframe for which to plan? How
do you frame the duty so that well-intentioned decision makers are not pe-
nalized if they make the wrong decision, even if based on best available
science? When is coastal retreat the only right answer? This Article seeks to
begin to answer these critically important questions. 5
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the relevant developments in
climate science, notably the increased willingness of scientists to attribute
contemporary extreme events to climate change as well as the widespread
underestimation of the severity of climate change. As in Litigating Climate
Change Adaptation, this Article focuses on forecasts of sea-level rise
("SLR") and its impacts to our coastlines. 6 Local governments wield sig-
nificant influence on the development patterns and the resilience of the in-
frastructure within the coastal zone. Accordingly, Part I demonstrates why
local governments' duties are an appropriate focus of research and inquiry.
Part II explores what reasonable conduct under climate-change cir-
cumstances might look like for local governments. There are many ele-
ments of climate change that are quite unique to the phenomenon-namely,
the degree of uncertainty that inheres, the myriad scales of governance and
decision making implicated, and the lack of precedent or appropriate ana-
logues that can guide sound action in response to climate impacts. Yet,
some kind of principled and uniform approach is necessary. Therefore, Part
II also considers the emerging best practices for adaptation and resilience
that provide guidance for determining reasonable conduct, which is valua-
ble for both the decision maker as well as the relevant arbiters in adaptation
litigation. 7 This Part briefly tests these approaches against the easier, more
difficult, and most challenging circumstances of climate-change adaptation.
Part III briefly considers the public policy arguments for introducing a
legally cognizable duty where there has been none prior and removing im-
munity shields in instances where they clearly make communities more
vulnerable. As the linkages between climate change and severe events be-
come even more concrete, the expectation-and perhaps even duty-for
15 While there is literature that similarly anticipates increased adaptation-related litigation, there
has not been a comprehensive exploration of the related duty and breach questions in a climate change
context. For the former, see generally ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42613, CLIMATE
CHANGE AND EXISTING LAW: A SURVEY OF LEGAL ISSUES PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2012) ("Sea
level rise and extreme precipitation linked to climate change raise questions as to ... design and opera-
tion of federal levees; and ... government failure to take preventive measures against climate change
harms." (from the report's unpaginated summary)); James Wilkins, Is Sea Level Rise "Foreseeable"?
Does It Matter?, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 437,489-90 (2011).
16 See Burkett, supra note 1, at 11152. The associated analysis would also be relevant to any
community at the banks of a body of water.
17 This, of course, is the judge, when making determinations regarding the presence of a cogniza-
ble duty, and the jury, at the breach determination stage.
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local entities will be to take those impacts into account when making deci-
sions affecting vulnerable areas. Further, if mistake, lack of competence, or
willful ignorance on the part of local entities result in more devastating
damage from climate change, it is manifestly unfair and dangerously costly
to have those harmed bear the burden alone.
Ultimately, the aim of this Article is not to punish already burdened
and, in many cases, resource-strapped local governments. Instead, it seeks
to encourage local governments to prepare earnestly and aggressively for
the inevitable and increasingly dangerous changes global warming presents.
It is the most vulnerable-geographically and socioeconomically-who
stand to suffer the most severe consequences of natural disasters and the
anthropogenic inputs that both cause climate change and simultaneously
increase our defenselessness in the face of it. By using established norms of
duty and reasonable conduct, and leveraging the strength and success of
property loss-related claims, litigation can galvanize local governments to
do their best-now--for the benefit of all.
I. TORT LIABILITY AND CLIMATE-CHANGE ADAPTATION AT THE
LOCAL LEVEL
Climate change-related litigation based on the tort of negligence will
likely proliferate as the impacts of heat, storms, and fire further compro-
mise infrastructure. 8 In the context of SLR and more destructive storm
surge and flooding, viable claims by private property owners are numer-
ous.'9 In fact, local jurisdictions in Australia, another common law country,
have already seen climate-related claims based on decisions made with re-
spect to the impact of development approval on third parties and construc-
tion of coastal protection works, among other claims."
Adaptation to climate change at the local level is critically important
because experiences of climate-induced weather events will vary at much
smaller geographical scales. Further, the protection from personal and
property losses has traditionally occurred most effectively at the local lev-
18 See generally MELTZ, supra note 15; BAKER & MCKENZIE, LOCAL COUNCIL RISK OF
LIABILITY IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE-RESOLVING UNCERTAINTIES 39 (2011), available at
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/-/media/publications/local-govt/alga-report-final-pdfpdf.
19 See, e.g., BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at 25-26. Residents could sue a Council for
negligently failing to consider SLR, flood, fire protection, or erosion control when granting development
consent. Id. at 36.
20 Id. at 3. Another Australian researcher concluded that, "local governments will only be at risk
of civil liability-in nuisance or in negligence-for failing to take into account the impacts of climate
change if their actions, or inactions, constitute a wholly unreasonable response to the risk of climate
change." Philippa England, Heating up: Climate Change Law and the Evolving Responsibilities of Local
Government, 13 LOC. GOV'T L.J. 209, 218 (2008), available at http://www98.griffith.edu.au/
dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/26762/55160_ .pdf.
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el.21 This Part briefly describes the current state of science on climate-
induced events relevant at the coastline and then discusses the unique and
critical relationship that local government-and local governance-has to
these events. The purpose of the discussion is to demonstrate why it is criti-
cally important for the law to address the negligent acts of municipalities.2
A. Relevant Climate and Sea-Level Rise Forecasts and Impacts
Emerging climate science now suggests that we are exceeding the
worst-case scenarios for the speed and severity of climate change. 3 This
has important implications for local governments who must adapt to it. In
2012, more frequent and extreme weather events broke thousands of precip-
itation and temperature records and millions of acres burned, resulting in
billions of dollars of damage.24
Climate scientists, who are not known for hyperbole, are now more
willing to identify the signature of climate change in these recent weather
trends and identify the need for actions to reduce the impacts of SLR, in
particular.25 Climate change's signature on SLR is well established through
both modeling and observation.26 Two recent studies underscore the vast
21 See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
22 I use local government and municipalities interchangeably throughout. Municipality describes a
political subdivision, such as cities, towns, or districts, which permits or fosters growth or constructs
infrastructure to manage sewage, drainage, or roadways, among other things. See, e.g., Steven Frederic
Lachman, Should Municipalities Be Liable for Development-Related Flooding?, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J.
945, 947 (2001).
23 See generally Bill McKibben, Global Warming's Terrifying New Math, ROLLING STONE, Aug.
2, 2012, at 52, 57 (describing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's June 2012 "travel[] on a Norwegian
research trawler to see firsthand the growing damage from climate change. 'Many of the predictions
about warming in the Arctic are being surpassed by the actual data,' [Clinton] said, describing the sight
as 'sobering."').
24 See generally Kodas, supra note 10; Somerville & Masters, supra note 8. This was true for
2011 as well. See Meg Crawford, Business and Government Start Preparing for Climate Impacts,
CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.c2es.orgfblog/
crawfordm/business-govemment-start-preparing-climate-impacts (explaining that by the end of 2011,
the United States had recorded more billion-dollar disasters than it did during all of the 1980s, totaling
about $55 billion in losses).
25 In a recent study, researchers, including NASA climatologist James Hansen, explained, "[w]e
can state, with a high degree of confidence, that extreme anomalies . . . were a consequence of global
warming because their likelihood in the absence of global warming was exceedingly small." Monte
Morin, Some Climate Scientists, in a Shift, Link Weather to Global Warming, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12,
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/12/science/la-sci-weather-climate-change-20121013 (second
alteration in original); see also Kolja Rotzoll & Charles H. Fletcher, Assessment of Groundwater Inun-
dation as a Consequence of Sea-Level Rise, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE (Nov. 11, 2012)
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/joumal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimateI725.html ("Strong evidence on
climate change underscores the need for actions to reduce the impacts of sea-level rise.").
26 See, e.g., Rotzoll & Fletcher, supra note 25.
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underestimation of SLR projections to date.27 The first, based on observed
SLR, concluded that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's
estimations have lagged behind what is happening in the real world.21 It is
likely, therefore, that future projections are also inaccurate, portending
much greater average global SLR by the end of the twenty-first century.29
The second study looks at how much water stored in the Greenland and
Antarctic ice sheets has been moving into the oceans.3" If these ice sheets
melt entirely, some end-of-the-century projections for SLR double to a total
of two meters, or 6.6 feet.3' Half of the world's population lives within 62
miles of the coast and, as of 2010, 52 percent of the U.S. population-or
roughly 163 million people-lived in U.S. coastal watershed counties.
3 2
With elevated storm surges and increases in precipitation and heavy down-
pour, climate-induced SLR threatens millions of people and places billions
of dollars in property at risk.
Decision makers, resource managers, and local and regional planners
will need to prepare with vigilance. To date, however, municipalities for the
most part have not demonstrated the requisite vigilance.33 This is dangerous
27 Anil Ananthaswamy, Projections of Sea Level Rise Are Vast Underestimates, NEW SCIENTIST
(Nov. 29, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22561-projections-of-sea-level-rise-
are-vast-underestimates.html.
28 Id.
29 Id. Scientists also identify groundwater extraction for irrigation-a trend that will increase as
climate change causes more droughts-as a net contributor to future SLR. See id; Rotzoll & Fletcher,
supra note 25 ("Besides marine inundation, it is largely unrecognized that low-lying coastal areas may
also be vulnerable to groundwater inundation, which is localized coastal-plain flooding due to a rise of
the groundwater table with sea level.").
30 Ananthaswamy, supra note 27.
31 Anne C. Mulkem, Scientists Search for Strategy to Convey Seriousness of Sea-Level Rise,
CLIMATEWIRE (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/climatewire/2012/09/l0/1; see also
Michael D. Lemonick, Sea Level Rise: It Could Be Worse than We Think, CLIMATE PROGRESS, (July 2 1,
2012, 10:51 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/07/21/516171/sea-level-rise-it-could-be-worse-
than-we-think.
32 The U.S. Population Living in Coastal Watershed Counties, NAT'L OCEAN & ATMOSPHERIC
AGENCY, http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/population (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). Coastal watershed
counties encompass land areas where water flows into the ocean or Great Lakes. Id
33 See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, New York Is Lagging as Seas and Risks Rise, Critics Warn, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, at Al ("While some new buildings are being elevated or going above current
required flood protections-like a new recycling plant on a Brooklyn pier and the Port Authority's
transit hub at the World Trade Center site-most new construction is not being adapted to future flood
risks yet, industry representatives said."); see generally THE HEINZ CTR. ET AL., RESILIENT COASTS: A
BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION 1 (2009) (explaining that, despite the cost savings from loss prevention and
preparedness, coastal cities and towns lack adequate land-use requirements and building code standards
to realize the savings), available at http://www.heinzctr.org/Major Reports files/
Resilient%20Coasts%20Bueprint%2Ofor*/o20Action.pdf, Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity Is
Dead"-Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 21 (2010) (arguing that American law and policy is not keeping up with the need for
adaptation and that the global legal response is insufficient to deal with the localized details of climate
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in light of worst-case scenarios of climate change. It is also fiscally subop-
timal, as studies confirm that a dollar in prevention can save exponentially
more in cure. 4
Superstorm Sandy provides a fitting allegory for the crossroads at
which coastal communities now find themselves. The size and power of
Sandy revealed the way in which poor land-use decisions can exacerbate
already destructive coastal storms. 5 In an eerily prophetic statement made
six weeks prior to the superstorm coming on shore, Columbia University's
Earth Institute research scientist, Klaus H. Jacob, stated: "We've been ex-
tremely lucky... I'm disappointed that the political process hasn't recog-
nized that we're playing Russian roulette."36 Though not even at hurricane
strength when it hit the northeast on October 29, Sandy represented a "tip-
ping point" as an "unusual," "one in multi-century" weather event.37 While
it remains true that scientists cannot attribute a single storm to climate
change, Cynthia Rosenzweig-a Columbia University professor, noted
climate scientist, and cochairwoman of the New York Panel on Climate
Change-identified compelling areas of linkage between Superstorm Sandy
and climate change, including rising sea levels that made storm surges
higher. 8 The planning, engineering, and design challenges that inhere
should preoccupy local governments as they design and manage coastal
communities for the future.
Indeed, most relevant to this Article, Sandy also underscores the need
for local governments to appreciate fully the costs of, to date, low probabil-
change, requiring legal reforms at the national, state, and local levels). Of course, some municipalities
have been very proactive. See, e.g., State and Local Adaptation Plans, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER,
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/state-and-local-plans (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
34 For savings in the flood hazard mitigation context, see Press Release, Ass'n of State Floodplain
Managers, Floodplain Managers Urge Resilient Rebuilding from Sandy (Oct. 31, 2012) (explaining that
"[f]ederal and industry studies have confirmed that for every dollar invested in flood hazard mitigation,
approximately five dollars is saved in disaster payouts and economic disruption"), available at
http://www.nvoad.org/sandy-updates/219-floodplain-managers-urge-resilient-rebuilding-from-sandy;
see also THE HEINZ CTR. ET AL., supra note 33, at 1. Increased disasters have produced significant
losses, economic and otherwise. Justin Gillis & Felicity Barringer, As Coasts Rebuild and U.S. Pays,
Repeatedly, the Critics Ask Why, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012, at Al.
35 See generally John Rudolf et al., Hurricane Sandy Damage Amplified by Breakneck Develop-
ment of Coast, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.huflingtonpost.com/2012/
11/12/hurricane-sandy-damage n 2114525.html.
36 Navarro, supra note 33, at A20.
37 Colin Sullivan, Columbia University Panel Urges Quick Action to Plan 'Coastal City for the
Future', CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.eenews.netlclimatewire/2012/l1/20/archive/
5?terms=colin+sullivan. There were many "unusual or unprecedented" elements of Hurricane Sandy,
including: "its gigantic scope, with tropical-force winds that spanned over 1,000 miles; [the presence of]
the highest water levels ever at New York's Battery, a 32-foot wave in New York Harbor; and the
simple fact that it veered west, to hit the New Jersey shore, which has never occurred in recorded histo-
ry." Id.
38 Id.
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ity yet unprecedented and devastating events. Instead of rezoning at-risk
areas to cease development, however, decision makers in New York and
New Jersey allowed continued heavy development of risky coastal areas
even though they were increasingly aware of the potential for "massive
storm surge in the region."39 At least two fatalities in Staten Island occurred
in developments completed as recently as the 1990s in coastal areas at ex-
treme risk of storm surge flooding.4" Regarding New Jersey, which suffered
economic losses estimated at $9 to $15 billion, researchers at Princeton
University in 2005 found that the rapid population growth in New Jersey's
"coastal counties was setting the scene for monumental environmental
damage and property loss."4' Much of the hazards, according to the report,
were man-made and predictable.42 Episodic flooding events due to storm
surges are, for example, failures in land-use planning and building code
requirements.43
Sandy demonstrated that the local authorities' failure to make deci-
sions based on numerous long-predicted reports warning of the coastline's
inevitable vulnerability amplified the storm's inherent destructive capaci-
ty.' What is worse is the prospect of repeated errors. Before declaring that
there was "no question in my mind we'll rebuild it," New Jersey Governor
Chris Christie described the post-Sandy damage to the state's coastal com-
munities as "unthinkable."45 It was, however, imagined repeatedly.46
39 See Rudolf et al., supra note 35 (citing numerous reports and studies over decades that high-
lighted the region's increasing vulnerability).
40 Id.
41 id.
42 id.
43 MATTHEW J.P. COOPER ET AL., FUTURE SEA LEVEL RISE AND THE NEW JERSEY COAST:
ASSESSING POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 24 (2005).
44 See generally Rudolf et al., supra note 35 (providing a "Sounding the Alarm" timeline).
45 id.
46 Master plans and reports predicted the growing dangers from continued development. See, e.g.,
CYNTHIA ROSENZWEIG ET AL., RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN NEW YORK STATE 39 (2011); Rae
Zimmerman & Craig Faris, Infrastructure Impacts and Adaptation Challenges, in NEW YORK CITY
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2010 REPORT 63, 76 (2010); Alan I. Benimoff, Presentation at the Geolog-
ical Society of America Northeastern Section (45th Annual) and Southeastern Section (59th Annual)
Joint Meeting: A GIS Study of Urbanization in Hurricane Slosh Zones on Staten Island, NY (Mar. 13-
16, 2010) (summary available at https://gsa.confex.com/gsa/20IONE/finalprogram/abstract_
169194.htm); see also STATE OF NEW JERSEY, I NEW JERSEY SHORE PROTECTION MASTER PLAN 54
(1981). As more of these kinds of reports surface, local governments might have more difficulty skirting
liability.
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B. Foreseeable Impacts, Planning, and Local Government Domain
One scholar has described municipalities as chartered creations of the
state that "represent[] the common good."47 They are responsible for every-
thing from land-use planning and development to infrastructure manage-
ment to public health and emergency planning. Climate-induced weather
extremes compromise each of these core responsibilities. 8 Further, local
governments are already the most susceptible to natural hazard-based liabil-
ity suits because "[i]t is at the local level that most of the active manage-
ment of hazardous lands occurs (road building and maintenance; operation
of public buildings such as schools, libraries, town halls, sewer and water
plants; parks)."49 Local governments have also approved most private sub-
divisions and permitted planned and existing buildings." Despite access to
better information and knowledge of the diverse costs of failing to adapt to
climate change-from damaged infrastructure to lost productivity to loss of
life5 -local governments fail to represent the common good by failing to
plan appropriately52 or by dissenting from key substantive recommenda-
tions. 3
Legal claims to encourage such action might proliferate and provide a
stick to encourage appropriate calculation of the costs and benefits of adapt-
ing today. Similar climate litigation has already occurred in Australia,54
47 Lachman, supra note 22, at 949.
48 See, e.g., Barry Chalofsky, Op-Ed, As Storms Intensify, New Jersey Must Adapt, THE TIMES OF
TRENTON, Aug. 16, 2012, at AI5; Eric Klinenberg, Op-Ed, Is It Hot Enough for Ya?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 2012, at SR4. In the context of public utilities, see, e.g., Matthew L. Wald & John Schwartz, Rise in
Weather Extremes Threatens Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, at A4.
49 JON A. KUSLER & EDWARD A. THOMAS, NO ADVERSE IMPACT AND THE COURTS: PROTECTING
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF ALL 15 (2007). The local level is also "where most public services with
potential for creating liability, such as flood fighting, police, ice removal, emergency evacuation, and
ambulance services, are provided." Id.
50 Id. at 18.
51 Crawford, supra note 24. Coastal construction and reconstruction also introduces a somewhat
hidden cost in the form of federally subsidized repair of storm-damaged infrastructure, see Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-207 (2006), and flood
insurance, National Flood Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-129. See generally, Gillis & Barrin-
ger, supra note 34.
52 See, e.g., Wade Rawlins, North Carolina Lawmakers Reject Sea Level Rise Predictions,
REUTERS, July 3, 2012, available at http://in.reuters.com/articlel2012/07/03/environment-usa-
northcarolina-idlNL2E813DW320120703.
53 See, e.g., Rudolf et al., supra note 35 (describing the Bloomberg administration's decision not
to follow the New York State Sea Level Rise Task Force's recommendations and citing "the 'huge,
huge dollar signs' associated with the report's recommendations and the 'tension' between the goals of
development and environmental protection").
54 See generally BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 18; see also Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline
Peel, Litigation's Regulatory Pathways and the Administrative State: Lessons from U.S. and Australian
Climate Change Governance 31 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with George Mason Law
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with instances of successful resolution.55 In those cases, the courts deemed a
precautionary approach and proactive adaptation as appropriate, "notwith-
standing the absence or evolving nature of state coastal planning policy
frameworks."56 The subsequent local "government efforts to develop [cli-
mate-change] policy measures and decision-making guidelines for coastal
climate change adaptation" and development approval hewed closely to the
courts' decisions." Assuming that similar claims will land with greater fre-
quency in American courts, with the knock-on effect of improved adapta-
tion planning, to which standard of reasonable conduct will courts hold
local governments in the U.S.? Will a precautionary approach, evidence of
proactive adaptation, or cursory consideration of climate change in decision
making suffice?
II. DUTY
An intuitive sense that local governments should be obliged to protect
property owners under the dangerous and unique circumstances of climate
change does not alone justify the law recognizing and giving effect to that
obligation. Indeed, without a clear sense of the nature of the duty owed, to
whom it is owed, and what one can reasonably do to meet that duty, it is not
clear that an arbiter will find a potential defendant liable for damages that
ensue-even if one can justify liability on efficiency grounds or a more
universal sense of fairness and morality.
The great complexities and unprecedented nature of climate change
makes it difficult for municipalities to determine whether they are obliged
to intervene in all components of adaptation-related decision making under
their purview. Some actions may after all be more appropriate for private
decision making. There are many instances in which the line between gov-
ernment obligation and private decision making is clear. To the extent that
climate change manifests as an extreme amplification of familiar environ-
mental stresses-like flooding-there is an existing body of state common
law with copious (even if conflicting) holdings that tackle the main negli-
gence elements, namely duty and breach. These are the easier cases ex-
plained below." One can look to this deep body of case law, overlay likely
climate-change scenarios, and come up with the best estimation of what
constitutes nonnegligent action on the part of the local government. The
Review) (arguing that adaptation litigation has served to advance Australian regulation and planning for
future climate impacts far beyond the United States, among other developed countries).
55 See Taip v E. Gippsland Shire Council [2010] VCAT 1222 (Austl.); Gippsland Coastal Bd. v
South Gippsland Shire Council (No.2) [2008] VCAT 1545 (Austl.); see generally, BAKER & MCKENZiE,
supra note 18; Osofsky & Peel, supra note 54, at 30-31.
56 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 18, at 30-31.
57 Id. at 31.
58 For greater explication, see discussion infra Part l.B.
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disposition of climate adaptation cases in which the appropriate timescale,
for example, and other peculiarities of climate change are predominant -
such as "preparing" for abrupt climate change or climate surprises-are
harder cases. Finally, there are the "wicked" 9 cases. These are the instances
in which an expansion of duty obligations is the only appropriate result but
political complexities and poor precedent significantly retard appropriate
and efficient action.
This Part takes the easier, harder, and "wicked" cases in turn in the fol-
lowing Sections and attempts to provide guidance on how local govern-
ments might anticipate potential adaptation-related liability and act reason-
ably under the circumstances.
A. "Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances"
In order to find a local government negligent for its actions in light of
climate change, a plaintiff must establish that the local government's con-
duct "falls below the standard established by law for the protection of oth-
ers against unreasonable risk of harm."' ° To prove negligence, a plaintiff
property owner must satisfy four elements: duty, breach, causation, and
damages. Duty and breach are most relevant here. Did the municipality owe
a duty of care to these particular plaintiffs? If so, what was the nature of
that duty and did the local government breach it?
1. Establishing Duty and Reasonable Care
The general duty owed to others is to act reasonably toward those who
are foreseeably at risk from a defendant's behavior.6 Foreseeability is not
the sole determinate of viable plaintiffs.62 Indeed, there are many foreseea-
ble victims of climate change to whom a legally cognizable claim is cur-
rently unavailable.63 Generally speaking, there is no duty to act affirmative-
59 See Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009) ("Scholars long ago characterized a public-
policy problem with the kinds of features presented by climate change as a 'wicked problem' that defies
resolution because of the enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stake-
holders implicated by any effort to develop a solution.").
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
61 For a discussion of duty and breach in the context of claims brought against greenhouse gas
emitters, see David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate
Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1756-58 (2007).
62 See id at 1768-69.
63 Courts generally do not hold the government liable when claims are based on negligence re-
garding nonstructural measures, even if the error is egregious or was easily preventable. See JON A.
KUSLER, ASs'N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS FOUND., A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT PUBLIC
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ly to aid another; however, while there is no affirmative duty to act to re-
duce naturally occurring flooding, for example, a municipality's ultimate
decision to act triggers the duty to act reasonably. 4 Further, duty is "'an
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the
law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."' 65 In short,
foreseeability coupled with other compelling policy concerns66 will deter-
mine whether or not a legal obligation exists or emerges.
Flooding, for instance, is foreseeable.67 Indeed, coastal hazards have
become more "foreseeable" and predictable with improved technology and
mapping.68 This conclusion is consistent with the current duties the law
imposes on local governments, such as the duty to ensure that municipal
infrastructure is in good enough shape not to increase flooding to neighbor-
ing property during a reasonably anticipated storm event.69 This may also
justify a more expansive conception of appropriate operation and mainte-
nance standards for municipal infrastructure as modeled under a
downscaled climate scenario, for example.7" Increasingly sophisticated data
and "the rapidly accumulating body of evidence concerning climate" im-
pacts may even make an unprecedented event foreseeable.7
To establish breach, therefore, the plaintiff property owner would need
to show that a reasonable government "in the defendant's position would
take certain reasonable precautions against a reasonably foreseeable risk of
injury. '72 There are generally accepted approaches to determine reasonable
conduct. The cost-benefit analysis of the Hand Formula captures the overall
utility of the conduct: if the costs (B) of preventing the harm are less than
LIABILITY FOR FLOOD HAZARD MITIGATION 10 (2009), available at http://www.floods.org/PDF/
Mitigation/ASFPM Comparative look atpub liabilityfor flood haz mitigation 09.pdf; see also
infra Part Ill.
64 KUSLER, supra note 63, at 10; KUSLER & THOMAS, supra note 49, at 17 (citing Indian Towing
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)) ("Courts have repeatedly held that once a governmental unit
elects to undertake government activities, even where no affirmative duty exists for such action, it must
exercise reasonable care."); Christopher City, Note, Duty and Disaster: Holding Local Governments
Liable for Permitting Uses in High-Hazard Areas, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1535, 1552 (2000) ("Under present
law, a local government may be held liable for breaching a duty assumed when it takes actions that
place third parties at risk of injury or otherwise induces reliance by third parties.").
65 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 61, at 1748 n.32 (quoting Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d
719, 722 (Or. 1979)).
66 For a listing of factors courts have considered to determine duty of care, see id. at 1768-69.
67 KuSLER & THOMAS, supra note 49, at 15.
68 Id. at 13 ("With improved predictive capability and the actual mapping of areas, hazard events
are now (to a greater or lesser extent) 'foreseeable' and failing to take such hazards into account may
constitute negligence.").
69 See id. at 12.
70 See infra Part II.A.2.
71 J. Cullen Howe, Buildings, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 209, 227 (Mi-
chael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012).
72 BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at 28.
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anticipated damages (P*L),73 the conduct was unreasonable and a breach of
duty.74 A defendant is responsible for the harms of which they had actual or
constructive knowledge75 at the time their decision was made or their action
taken.76 For instance, if a local government did not know, but should have
known, about the likelihood of increased storm surge due to climate-
induced SLR, an arbiter might still find it in breach depending on the rela-
tive cost of protecting against the resulting flooding and other storm dam-
age to property.
In sum, the factors considered when determining the reasonableness of
government conduct might include the following: "whether government
staff have knowledge of potential flood problems, the foreseeability of
floods and resulting damage to individuals, the degree of risk involved, the
norms of the profession, applicable regulations, and the amount of discre-
tion involved."77 Indeed, courts have already often found local governments
liable for damages when unreasonable government conduct causes flood
erosion impacts. 8
2. ".... Under the Circumstances"
What reasonable conduct entails "under the circumstances" of a cli-
mate-change context will likely never be straightforward. Constantly shift-
ing conditions are an inherent characteristic of climate change, and scien-
tists also anticipate an accelerated rate of those shifts.79 There is no static
climate against which to plan."° Given the current state of the science, how-
73 In the Hand formula, P represents the likelihood of the harm occurring and L represents the
severity of that harm. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
74 id.
75 KUSLER & THOMAS, supra note 49, at 20; City, supra note 64, at 1552.
76 BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at 3. This means that courts or juries would not judge
local governments' decisions and actions by developments in climate science since the decision or
action took place. Id.
77 KUSLER, supra note 63, at 13. The "norms of the profession" may have limited effect due to the
unique impacts climate change presents. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. It is true, however, that coastal
communities may share similar impacts due to SLR. For a discussion of the role of discretion and im-
munity, see infra Part Ill.
78 KUSLER, supra note 63, at 13. "This is true for both structural and nonstructural measures." Id.
("There are many agreed upon and specific standards in the literature and in the engineering profession
for design of dams, dikes, levees, stormwater systems and other structures. This facilitates proof of a
'norm' and 'unreasonableness' in design, construction, operation, or maintenance."). There is, however,
no bright line to "determin[e] the unreasonableness of government decisions pertaining to nonstructural
measures." Id. at 13-14. As a result, negligence claims pertaining to the latter are less successful. Id.
79 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 30-33 (2007) [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT], available at http://
www.ipec.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf; BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at 17.
80 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 79, at 30-33.
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ever, there are a few actions that one might now say are manifestly unrea-
sonable. They include, but are not limited to, denying that climate change is
occurring and ignoring evidence of its impacts that are established, credible,
and have become widely available. s' As climate change progresses, more
actions will likely fall into the category of manifestly unreasonable conduct.
However, there are currently far more ambiguities regarding climate change
that will render a clear reasonableness determination elusive without further
clarity and general guidance, which is discussed below.82 This Section iden-
tifies a few of the main challenges of current and anticipated climate phe-
nomenon.
The presence of climate change is indisputable.83 Scientists have not
resolved whether specific climate events are caused by climate change,
however, and they likely will never be able to resolve this issue with com-
plete certainty.84 Of course, certainty is not required in tort cases, nor will
the certainty of the connection be dispositive. In other words, local gov-
ernments will need to act reasonably in light of the increased risk of ex-
treme events caused by climate change, not the absolute certainty of their
cause or occurrence. That may be an easier evidentiary bar for a plaintiff,
but it presents a unique quandary for municipalities seeking to avoid liabil-
ity. As Professors David Hunter and James Salzman explain, "[g]iven the
emerging understanding of climate change, determining what an appropri-
ate response should have been at any specific time is difficult. It is, in fact,
a subjective judgment about reasonableness--one that usually is left, in the
tort context, to juries."86 Thus, the potential local government defendant as
well as jurors will need some guidance on how to tackle this element of
planning for "foreseeable" unknowns.
Climate-change adaptation is, accordingly, rife with uncertainty.87 In
addition to the pervasive uncertainty of climate modeling and projections,
81 BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at 36. The report also adds "making decisions that in-
crease vulnerability without regard to available precautionary methods" to the list of manifestly unrea-
sonable actions. Id.; see also infra note 84 and accompanying text.
82 See infra Part II.A.3.
83 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 79, at 26-41.
84 See Burkett, supra note 1, at 11150.
85 See id. The level of uncertainty that inheres can also lead to regulatory paralysis. See Jan
McDonald, Mapping the Legal Landscape of Climate Change Adaptation, in ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: LAW AND POLICY 1, 27 (Tim Bonyhady et al. eds., 2010); see also SARA MOORE ET AL.,
DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ADAPTATION STRATEGIES AND
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT FOR RESOURCE MANAGERS 45 (2012). Scenario planning provides a valuable
tool. Id. at 2.
86 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 61, at 1773. Some aspect of the inquiry may remain in the hands
of the judge. Id. ("Although a judge might declare allegations of defendants' conduct before 1990 to be
non-negligent as a matter of law, after that point the determination would seem to be better left to ju-
ries.").
87 Uncertainty is distinct from risk. "Economists distinguish between 'uncertainty' (where the
likelihood of the peril is nonquantifiable) and 'risk' (where the likelihood is quantifiable)." Daniel A.
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when scientists attempt to "downscale" those projections-that is, provide
climate forecasting for more narrow regional scales based on global climate
trends-uncertainty with regard to future conditions increases."8 Professor
Jan McDonald argues, "uncertainty over the direction and not just the de-
gree of change [at the regional and local scales] makes meaningful planning
for anything other than 'variability' virtually impossible." 9 There is also
the phenomenon of the "fat tail" that is characteristic of climate change and
suggests that catastrophic events will be more common.9" Fat tails "describe
systems that have a higher likelihood than the normal curve of extreme out-
comes-in a graph, the tail of the distribution does not thin out as quickly
as the normal distribution."'" In other words, extreme events are much more
likely than is typical of the bell curve, which depicts a normal distribution.92
The "obesity" of the fat tail, against which municipalities must plan, is un-
certain.93 Further, the way in which these changes will impact the environ-
ments with which they interact is unclear. The possibility of "threshold ef-
fects" or abrupt climate change exacerbates these impacts.94
All of this leads to uncertainty regarding the most desirable or practi-
cable policy approach. McDonald explains that the "unprecedented com-
plexity and the fact that other environmental and natural resource regimes
have been ineffective in reversing resource degradation and ecosystem de-
cline complicates the choice of policy instruments for adaptation."95 Of
Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 901 (2011). In addition, uncertainty is also not ignorance. Id. at
903 (noting that "[u]ncertainty is not the same as complete ignorance. Large bodies of data and theory
bear on climate change"). Professor Dan Farber further explains that, "[u]ncertainty is particularly
pernicious in situations in which catastrophic outcomes are possible, but conventional decision tools are
not equipped to cope with these potentially disastrous results." Id at 901.
88 See McDonald, supra note 85, at 27 (describing "four tiers of uncertainty that affect adaptive
law making"). Professor Farber's articulation of the "uncertainty" challenge of models and downscaling
is helpful: "Climate models differ in terms of the severity of climate change that they predict for any
given future emissions path, and the future emissions path depends on mitigation limits that are not yet
known. Downscaling the models to predict local impacts introduces further uncertainties." Farber, supra
note 87, at 944 (footnote omitted).
89 McDonald, supra note 85, at 28.
90 Farber, supra note 87, at 923.
91 Id.
92 id.
93 Id. at 926-927 (quoting Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of
Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REv. ECON. & STAT. 1,9 (2009)).
94 McDonald, supra note 86, at 28 (citing James Hansen, Tipping Point: Perspective of a Clima-
tologist, in 2008-2009 STATE OF THE WILD: A GLOBAL PORTRAIT OF WILDLIFE, WILDLANDS, AND
OCEANS 6-15 (Eva Feam ed., 2008); WILL STEFFEN ET AL., AUSTRALIA'S BIODIVERSITY AND CLIMATE
CHANGE: TECHNICAL SYNTHESIS 42-46 (2009); Marten Scheffer et al., Early- Warning Signals for Criti-
cal Transitions, 461 NATURE 53, 53-59 (2009)).
95 McDonald, supra note 86, at 28 (citing Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Cli-
mate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 9 (2009)).
These are formidable challenges for climate change adaptation, however, they should not prevent or
delay adaptation action. Rasmus Heltberg et al., Addressing Human Vulnerability to Climate Change:
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course, this does not counsel against action, nor has it hampered local level
adaptation planning in many cases." It does, however, require careful artic-
ulation of additional factors to employ to determine breach of a duty to ex-
ercise due care in a climate-impacted community.
The issue of geographical scale for purposes of determining what is
appropriate at the community level creates another formidable obstacle as
custom is not a reliable means of assessing due care.97 Juries can look to
custom or industry practice to provide persuasive, though not conclusive,
evidence of best practices in a given arena.98 Climate impacts are divergent
and a community's exposure to it will depend on its population, topogra-
phy, and a myriad of other unique and diverse characteristics. Climate-
change adaptation is an "intensely local" endeavor,99 and so useful compari-
sons will be few and far between. Moreover, as climate change, climatolo-
gy, and relevant technologies evolve, so will expectations regarding munic-
ipalities,"' though perhaps according to their resources and capacity.'' All
local governments will not have the ability to move as rapidly, and perhaps
different adaptation milestones will be reasonable in some cases.
The relative capacities of local governments speak to policy concerns
that might override a finding of negligence in some circumstances. In adap-
tation litigation, courts will have to weigh the injuries of property owners
against the costs to local governments of imposing adaptation measures.
Courts may reject liability out of concern that the scale of liability will have
the capacity to "crush" defendant municipalities.0 2 Tort liability might be
so great that it exceeds the bounds of adjudication and is more appropriate
for legislative resolution.0 3 In these instances, arguably ones that climate
change will introduce, courts may not impose a duty. While this Article
Toward a 'No Regrets' Approach, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 89, 94 (2009) ("Uncertainty extends
into the policy arena: levels of funding, implementation arrangements, and effectiveness of proposed
adaptation interventions are all uncertain and contested. Uncertainty, however, should not delay ac-
tion.").
96 See Burkett, supra note 1, at 11152 (citing Quirin Schiermeier, The Real Holes in Climate
Science, 463 NATURE 284, 285 (2010)).
97 See Hunter & Salzman, supra note 61, at 1777.
98 See generally id. at 1776-78.
99 Craig, supra note 33, at 29; see also Hunter & Salzman, supra note 61, at 1777-78.
100 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 61, at 1778 ("'[ l]deas of the court, expressed 40 years ago ...
[are not] necessarily authoritative on the engineering and financial phases of the same problem today."'
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Bartlett v. N. Pac. Ry., 447 P.2d 735, 737 (Wash.
1968)).
101 See Scott Malone, Some Cities Find Small Steps Key to Storm Protection, REUTERS (Nov. 20,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/1 1/20/us-storm-sandy-adaptation-
idUSBRE8AJ08J20121120 ("Planners said they had few resources available to help their cities adapt to
a changing climate-not just the threat of more storms-with a large number listing securing funds as a
major challenge to their ability to plan.").
102 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 61, at 1781-82.
103 Id.
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addresses and defends an expanded imposition of duty on other policy
grounds, the line that determines what might constitute crushing liability is
elusive. This is especially true if one considers the equal if not greater
"crush" of cleaning up after large storms."°
All of these uncertainties do not argue in favor of inaction or reduced
exposure to liability. They do demand a cataloguing of best practices and
other methodology that will facilitate reasonable responses to climate im-
pacts. Departures from these (largely) process-oriented recommendations
will provide a universe of possible actions against which an arbiter can
judge reasonable conduct.
3. Emerging Methods, Standards, and Best Practices
While there are specific actions that can avoid manifestly unreasonable
conduct, there are emerging methods to ensure that local government deci-
sion making will tend to produce effective adaptation planning, even in the
presence of uncertainty and variability. It seems clear that local govern-
ments should, at base, remain informed of current climate science and avail
themselves of opportunities to keep staff educated about climate impacts
and the scope of potential risks that local governments should consider. °5
Local governments should generally rely on the "best available science" at
the time of decision making, particularly when considering adaptation
measures."° In fact, local governments might "exceed the vagaries of the
common law standard of. . . 'reasonable and relevant"' by including an
explicit reference to climate change in planning schemes. 7 Yet, as Austral-
ian legal scholar Phillippa England asked in 2008, "[h]ow can local gov-
ernments avoid taking action that is 'manifestly unreasonable' in an area
characterised by uncertainty, long term impacts and rapidly accruing infor-
mation?"'0° The best practice, she argues, "is for councils to integrate cli-
mate change considerations into their existing risk management strate-
gies."'"° Numerous studies identify "the substantive and procedural fea-
104 See, e.g., Jonathan Tamari, Obama: $60B for Sandy Cleanup, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Dec. 8, 2012, at Al.
105 BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at 10. A centralized advisory body or agency may serve
this purpose by collecting and disseminating information and providing assistance and input to aid local
governments in risk assessment and adaptation decision making. Id. at 15. See generally Andrew Macin-
tosh, A Theoretical Framework for Adaptation Policy, in ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND
POLICY, supra note 85, at 38.
106 Robert R.M. Verchick & Joel D. Scheraga, Protecting the Coast, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION
TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 71, at 235, 238; McDonald, supra note 85, at 29.
107 England, supra note 20, at 221. It is still not clear, however, whether anything more than a
cursory mention of climate is necessary.
10' Id. at 220.
109 Id.
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tures" that one might consider when assessing the reasonableness of local
government decision making." ° They include: "adequately resourced
[measures], preferably with clear incentives for implementation[;] ...in-
corporation or mainstreaming of adaptation measures[;] ...stakeholder
engagement in the entire adaptation process-from identification of risks or
vulnerabilities to the generation and testing of adaptation options; ... [and]
evaluation of effectiveness and monitoring for continuous improvement."'' .
Emerging principles for adaptive management and models of scenario-
based planning and risk assessment provide blueprints for this kind of ef-
fective climate-change integration. Several scholars and researchers have
written on the value and structure of adaptive management." 2 Its core prin-
ciples "allow for staged transitions to higher levels of intervention when
specified thresholds are reached and can drive ongoing improvement
through built-in monitoring and evaluation processes."' ' Adaptive man-
agement includes six basic steps: (1) assess the problem; (2) design an in-
tervention; (3) implement it; (4) monitor it; (5) evaluate it; and (6) adjust
the intervention on that basis." 4 The local government would then return to
assessing climate-change-impacted decision making once again. In fact,
because climate impacts will occur over long time scales and constantly
shift in pace and geographic scope, "governments cannot and should not
develop complete adaptation strategies" in the near term.' Sequenced re-
sponses" 6 with ample opportunity to learn from experience may be more
likely to produce reasonable conduct over the longer term." 7
110 McDonald, supra note 85, at 12.
111 Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES: FINAL REPORT 21
(Mike Hulme et at. eds., 2009); G.M. McKeon et al., Climate Change: Adapting Tropical and Subtropi-
cal Grasslands, in GRASSLANDS FOR OUR WORLD 426, 432 (M.J. Baker ed., 1993); Erika Spanger-
Siegfried & Bill Dougherty et al., User's Guidebook, in ADAPTATION POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE: DEVELOPING STRATEGIES, POLICES AND MEASURES 5, 11 (Bo Lim & Erika Span-
ger-Siegfried eds., 2004); Camacho, supra note 95, at 16; Hans-Martin Fussel & Richard J. T. Klein,
Climate Change Vulnerability Assessments: An Evolution of Conceptual Thinking, 75 CLIMATE
CHANGE 301, 321-22 (2006); S. Mark Howden et al., Adapting Agriculture to Climate Change, 104
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 19691, 19695 (2007)).
112 See generally Camacho, supra note 95; Craig, supra note 33; J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adap-
tation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENvTL. L. 363 (2010); see also
MOORE ET AL., supra note 86, at 66 ("The theory of an adaptive management approach to natural re-
source management, developed in the 1970s, can be understood as a 'systematic, rigorous approach for
deliberately learning from management actions with the intent to improve subsequent management
policy or practice"') (quoting Defining Adaptive Management, B.C. MINISTRY OF FORESTS AND RANGE,
http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfp/amhome/Admin/index.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2013)).
113 McDonald, supra note 85, at 36-37.
114 MOORE ET AL., supra note 85, at 45-46 (citing Defining Adaptive Management, supra note
112).
115 Craig, supra note 33, at 40.
116 Heltberg et al., supra note 95, at 94-95.
117 Camacho, supra note 95, at 49-50 (footnote omitted).
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Scenario planning is a decision-making tool that can encourage rea-
sonable conduct in the face of the foreseeable risks of climate change for
which robustness is the goal."8 It is most useful in situations of high uncer-
tainty." 9 In short, scenario planning "incorporates the best available infor-
mation on climatic and socio-economic trends to create multiple, plausible
future scenarios built on the variables of highest concern" for the relevant
decision makers. 2° Agencies like the National Park Service currently em-
ploy this tool and "bring[] together scientists, resource managers, and other
stakeholders to develop a small number of internally consistent, plausible
narratives (scenarios) based on the best available science regarding future
climate conditions for a given system of interest."'' A combination of sce-
nario planning and adaptive management's iterative processes is likely the
most effective approach for decision makers.'
These methods still give "principled"'2 latitude to local governments
to introduce a rigorous approach to adaptation that is at least above some
reasonable baseline.'24 Introduction of substantive recommendations, such
as "No Adverse Impact" ("NAI"), could reduce liability if, despite the cli-
mate forecast, municipalities still must occupy flood hazard areas.'25 Con-
sistent with contemporary common law rights and duties,'26 "[NAI] flood-
plain management is an approach which ensures that the action of one
property owner does not adversely impact the properties and rights of other
property owners, as measured by increased flood peaks, flood stage, flood
118 MOOREETAL., supra note 85, at 1.
119 Id.
120 Id. at ii. "Scenario ... refers to a description of a future built on the variables critical to deci-
sion-making, considering different projections of highly uncertain trends on a backdrop of highly certain
trends. In scenario planning, managers create a variety of scenarios, and then consider in depth a small
number of varied but equally plausible futures." Id. at 2 (footnote omitted) (citing PETER SCHWARTZ,
THE ART OF THE LONG VIEW: PATHS TO STRATEGIC INSIGHT FOR YOURSELF AND YOUR COMPANY
(1991)); see also Farber, supra note 87, at 933 ("[S]cenario planning . . . identiflies] unacceptable
courses of action and then choose[s] the most appealing remaining alternatives."). Farber recommends
"RAND's Robust Decision Making ... technique [to] provide[ a systematic way of exploring large
numbers of possible policies to identify robust solutions." Id at 933.
121 MOORE ET AL., supra note 85, at 40 (footnote omitted) (citing Katherine Waser, Scenario
Planning and the National Park Service, SW. CLIMATE CHANGE NETWORK (Aug. 12, 2009),
http://www.southwestclimatechange.org/solutions/adaptation/nps-scenario-planning; NAT'L PARK
SERV., SUMMARY: CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIO PLANNING WORKSHOP 3-8 (2007); SCHWARTZ, supra
note 120).
122 MOORE ET AL., supra note 85, at 42. These, along with multiscalar and interagency collabora-
tion, would be optimal.
123 Craig, supra note 33, at 63 ("Promote [pirincipled [fllexibility in [r]egulatory [g]oals and
[niatural [r]esource [m]anagement.").
124 England, supra note 20, at 220.
125 KUSLER, supra note 63, at 50.
126 KUSLER & THOMAS, supra note 49, at 4. With increasingly fewer exceptions, "[a]t common
law, no landowner (public or private) has a right to use his or her land in a manner that substantially
increases flood or erosion damages on adjacent lands . I... Id.
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velocity, and erosion and sedimentation."' 27 NAI is "a general guide for
landowner and community actions (construction of public works, use of
public lands, planning, regulations) in the watersheds and the floodplains"
that requires communities to understand potential development impacts and
implement loss mitigation programs proactively. 21 With the NAI approach,
communities seek to avoid an increase of flood-related impacts, develop-
ment permitting, and other activities.
29
When applied to discrete cases that represent a spectrum of scenarios
that climate change presents, the potential efficacy of the substantive and
procedural approaches discussed above becomes clearer.
B. Easier Cases
Because of the super-wicked'30 nature of climate change, it would be
naive to characterize any of the circumstances that it raises as easy. Yet,
relatively speaking, some duty- and breach-related questions will be more
straightforward to address than others, even under changed circumstances.
The first involves situations in which courts have already addressed and
resolved the relevant liability questions. The clearest examples are suits
against governments for increased natural hazards or hazard risks resulting
from government drainage ditches, fills, or structural flood hazard reduction
measures.' When a government acts in its capacity as a landowner it is
similarly obligated.'32 This will remain relevant under climate-change con-
ditions.
While a government cannot skirt its obligations with respect to public
works projects that it has already undertaken that increase flooding, erosion,
or other hazards on other lands, it can avoid liability-that is, act reasona-
bly-by not increasing flood hazards by building infrastructure in hazard-
risk areas.'33 This curtailment of public works projects will avoid reliance of
property owners on public infrastructure-and the accompanying common
law duty to do it well-and limit development in high-risk coastal areas.'34
127 Id. at 6.
128 Id. Indeed, the Association of State Floodplain Managers "recommends that [NAI] ... be the
default management standard for community regulations." Id. at 7.
129 Id. at4.
130 See generally supra note 59 and accompanying text.
131 See KUSLER, supra note 63, at 13.
132 See id.
133 Seeid. at 17.
134 See City, supra note 64, at 1541 (explaining that "[sitructural measures ... may encourage
development in areas adjacent to a protective structure, thereby resulting in higher losses when the
structure fails").
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Clearer science on the impacts of climate change will subject local
governments to far more property damage-related claims.'35 Using common
law justifications for imposing duty will necessarily extend to climate-
impacted scenarios, with a likely expansion of liability. 36 As the degree of
risk increases because of climate change, so too will the standard of care.
Therefore, local governments will have to act with greater precaution-and
more resilient materials-to avoid a finding of breach. Lack of knowledge
should not exculpate governments, as actual or constructive knowledge of
climate risks will be the most basic demonstration of reasonable conduct.
And, where governments must remain or expand into flood hazard areas,
employing standards such as NA may channel decision making toward
nonnegligent and, more than likely, adaptive action.'37
Another "easy" case concerns making determinations between com-
peting adaptation responses. In short, municipalities should avoid maladap-
tation-that is, adaptation measures that increase individual or community
vulnerability to climate change.' The directive is simple. Identifying and
avoiding it will be far more difficult. Nonetheless, there are some examples
that are instructive. Local governments should pursue the adaptation meas-
ure that has the least detrimental effect over the short and long term. For
example, the choice between hard armoring and soft armoring demonstrates
how the preferred measure of seawalls and coastal jetties is suboptimal
when compared to the use of vegetation and other natural ecosystems to
blunt the impacts of destructive erosion and storm surge.'39 Most recently,
the presence of dunes along the shoreline helped to blunt the impacts of
Sandy in some areas. 4 ' Hard shoreline armoring damages adjacent property
over the long term and provides a false sense of security at the coastline,
135 Reports like BAKER &MCKENZIE anticipate and comprehensively identify and analyze such
claims. See generally BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 18.
136 see infra Part Ill.
137 KUSLER, supra note 63, at 50 (advocating application of "a no adverse impact standard in
locating and constructing public works, and, in regulating private activities"). Kusler includes more
comprehensive recommendations for avoiding liability with respect to structural measures, including but
not limited to: "incorporate[ing] a wide safety factor in all designs[;] . . . [c]onsider[ing] and publi-
ciz[ing] residual risks"; use of "particular care" in maintenance and operation; and "[u]tiliz[ing] 'future
conditions' for calculating flood flows." Id. at 51.
138 See, e.g., Jon Barnett & Saffron O'Neill, Editorial, Maladaptation, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 211, 211 (2010). Maladaptation, even if there are attempts to vigilantly avoid it, appears inevi-
table. With the array of possible climate futures, decision makers will make decisions that unwittingly
increase vulnerability at times. For an interesting discussion regarding the likely increase in litigation
based on "design flaw[s] or policy choice[s]," depending on your vantage point, see Verchick &
Scheraga, supra note 106, at 248. 1 discuss the negligence of a well-intentioned local decision maker
below.
139 See, e.g., Verchick & Scheraga, supra note 106, at 240, 250-51; City, supra note 64, at 1541.
140 See Mireya Navarro & Rachel Nuwer, Resisted for Blocking the View, Dunes Prove They Blunt
Storms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2012, at Al.
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with the effect of encouraging further development along the coast.'4 ' In
contrast, soft armoring, though it allows for landward creep of the coastline,
provides many ecosystem services, including surge protection and water
filtration.'42
As a general rule, local governments should favor actions that have
multiple benefits and should disfavor any adaptation action that increases
path dependency.'43 Professor Robin Craig explains that "irreversible com-
mitment too early to particular strategies as opposed to taking a more cau-
tious, 'no regrets' approach at the outset is more likely to create path de-
pendencies that could actually impede future adaptation and even surviv-
al."'" These dependencies are diverse and may include extensive physical
structures or suboptimal economic arrangements. 1
45
C. Harder Cases
[Y]ou can't make a climate-proof city. 1
46
There are characteristics of climate change that are harder to tackle be-
cause they are unique to climate change and, therefore, have no historical
analogue. 147 Further, a steady concept of successful adaptation is impossible
to obtain, due in part to centuries-long inertia in the climate system and an
inability to know the ultimate effectiveness of an intervention. 4  The most
obvious problem is the issue of planning along appropriate timescales and
coping with abrupt climate change, a novel and unprecedented element of
global warming. Moreover, because of these and other difficulties, even
well-intentioned decision makers will get it wrong on occasion and perhaps
141 Verchick & Scheraga, supra note 106, at 241.
142 Id. at250-51.
143 Craig, supra note 33, at 40.
144 Id. (footnote omitted).
145 For example, the use of genetically modified organisms are often billed as an effective response
to climate-induced impacts, particularly droughts and floods, but they can have a maladaptive effect by,
among other things, reducing individual and community level resilience and biodiversity and simultane-
ously increasing dependence on external, global markets. Local farmers in the developing world, for
example, would be at the whim of the potential price shocks resulting from a fluctuation in global seed
prices. See generally Deborah B. Whitman, Genetically Modified Foods: Harmful or Helpful?, CSA
DISCOVERY GuIDES (Apr. 2000), http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/gmfood/review.pdf.
146 Navarro, supra note 33, at A20.
147 See McDonald, supra note 85, at 31. "What distinguishes the risk of irreversible consequences
in climate change is the scale and unpredictability of the threat and the absence of any historical ana-
logue." Id. Irrespective of the presence of an analogue, local governments should choose aggressive
action to avoid catastrophic and irreversible impacts.
148 Moore, supra note 85, at 65 (explaining that "[c]limate change is an ongoing process, prevent-
ing a true ex post facto (outcome) evaluation of effectiveness of intervention, e.g., sea level will be
rising for hundreds of years after greenhouse gases are stabilized in the atmosphere" (citation omitted)).
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most of the time. The above discussion raises several questions: What time
frame should one reasonably plan for when forecasts of impacts for the next
30, 50, and 100 years will almost certainly change as climate science im-
proves? How do municipalities reasonably prepare for unknowable surpris-
es, climate and otherwise?'49 And, how can the law impose a duty that does
not penalize a climate-responsible municipality?
An exact answer to the above questions is not immediately clear, nor
will the answer be uniform across planning horizons or locales. There are
parameters that one can logically put in place with respect to time scales.
Professor Andrew Macintosh provides a helpful, if a bit obvious, standard
for near-term impacts. "Where there is an immediate risk of inundation," he
explains, "common sense applies-governments should not allow devel-
opment that is at a high risk of destruction from natural causes."'5 Finding
the optimal course of action for more distant inundation arising from cli-
mate change is more challenging, Macintosh admits.'' He continues, how-
ever, by advocating a rule of thumb that counsels that delay is likely more
"appropriate when the adaptation in question involves projects with short
lead times, short cost/benefit lifetimes and reversible impacts."'5 Early
action is likely more appropriate in "projects with long lead times, long
cost/benefit lifetimes and irreversible impacts."'53 For this kind of delibera-
tion and decision making, it would make the most sense to rely on the prin-
ciples and attendant processes of adaptive management to get municipali-
ties to the best, nonnegligent course of action. A well-established govern-
ance infrastructure for adaptive management might also shield the well-
intentioned municipality from liability. If that process is working optimally,
the existence of a functional process alone may fulfill the reasonable con-
duct requirement. Further, the relevant decision makers can assess and
measure provisional outcomes of a planning decision against the needs of
existing circumstances and revise accordingly."'
Adaptive management's deliberative nature makes it less well suited to
deal with climate surprises."' Scenario planning would be appropriate here.
Municipalities can consider climate extremes, including those at the very
149 See id. at 46 (recommending that decision makers expect and prepare for climate surprises); see
also id. at 2 (explaining that "[cllimate models are not well-suited for demonstrating some aspects of
climate such as extremes, interactions, and feedback effects, and do not take into account decision-
critical factors that fall outside the climate system, such as political will or budgetary constraints").
150 Macintosh, supra note 105, at 51.
151 Id.
152 Id. at61.
153 Id.
154 See Moore, supra note 85, at 65 (explaining that "[t]he outcome of a certain intervention can be
measured against observable impacts at a given point in time,... [and] evaluation criteria and associat-
ed indicators [will measure] ... the design, process, outputs, and provisional outcomes of an interven-
tion").
155 Camacho, supra note 112, at 25-26.
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end of the fat tail, to work through a plan they would operationalize in the
event of abrupt change or surprise.
D. Wicked Cases
The most difficult cases might well be anthropogenic.' 56 In other
words, despite the grave climate forecast, the more formidable obstacles to
finding a comprehensive and coherent, while appropriately rigorous, adap-
tation approach-and the standard of care that would undergird it-may be
the circumstances that implicate long-standing political chasms. Here, re-
treat from the coastline serves as a paradigmatic example.157 "Retreat" de-
scribes government actions that discourage new development in disaster
prone areas or reconstruction following such disasters-that is, proactive
and reactive retreat, respectively.'58 Local governments are the "primary
actors" in implementing retreat policies as they make land-use decisions
necessary to facilitate retreat.'59 Even municipalities that confess a relatively
strong commitment to climate-change adaptation-demonstrated by bike
lanes, reduced energy use in buildings, and bans on the dirtiest home heat-
ing oils--consistently govern in opposition to retreat from the shoreline. 6°
Retreat remains among the most optimal responses to coastal hazards set to
worsen as climate change progresses, 6' yet it lacks the political will to
come up for serious deliberation, much less succeed.'62
156 See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Regulatory Takings and Property Rights Confront Sea Level Rise:
How Do They Roll?, 21 WIDENER L.J. 735 (2012).
157 While the very thorny issues around takings are relevant, I do not tackle them here. Numerous
scholars have considered the issue of takings in the context of climate change and coastal retreat. See,
e.g., DOUGLAS CODIGA ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND REGULATORY TAKINGS IN COASTAL HAWAI'I
(2011); Nolon, supra note 156; Verchick & Scheraga, supra note 106. For the most part, the discussion
of takings, climate change, and local government regulation of the coastline suggests that takings con-
cers are overstated. See, e.g., City, supra note 64, at 1569 ("Despite the fear of takings claims, the
premise that local government may reduce hazard risk through the regulation of private property is
generally sound.").
158 See Verchick & Scheraga, supra note 106, at 239.
159 J. Peter Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 71, at 267, 268.
160 See Navarro, supra note 33, at A20 (describing New York's inconsistent adaptation measures).
161 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne and Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 71, at 267; see also BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note
18, at 10 (discussing the need "to minimise development in highly vulnerable areas").
162 See Rudolf et al., supra note 35 ("Instead of spending money to protect what we already have,
experts also suggest there's another interim step just awaiting the political will to see it through: stop
building more homes and businesses where they too will require protection.").
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Balancing retreat against the current approaches of armoring, rebuild-
ing, and starting all over again'63 increasingly demonstrates that reasonable
conduct will militate in favor of actively moving away from the coasts.
State and local governments, as well as the federal government,"6 have
spent disproportionately on short-term coastal protection projects rather
than on retreat efforts, such as buyout programs endorsed by many re-
searchers and analysts that would discourage new development in the most
hazardous areas.'65 For instance, one could argue that local governments
along the Jersey Shore are not governing reasonably when they neither se-
nously consider nor actively pursue retreat through regulation. Further, the
costs of continuing to encourage new and existing development on the coast
may even eclipse the cost of acquisition, which is now prohibitively expen-
sive.
At the moment, these issues may be beyond the reach of the courts as
nonstructural 67 and policy-oriented planning decisions, for which courts do
not uniformly find a cognizable duty or, if they do, they allow immunity to
apply, respectively.'68 Expanded liability appears to be an emerging trend,69
however, which may have serious implications for local governments that
do not opt for the most climate-adaptive conduct in light of the high degree
of risk to person and property.
III. DISCRETION, CAPTURE, AND PUBLIC POLICY
If duty is truly "'an expression of the sum total of [policy] considera-
tions" that incites the law to recognize a plaintiff's 'entitle[ment] to pro-
tection,"" 7 and climate change is perhaps the single greatest threat to well-
being, a discussion of key policy considerations is necessary. This Part
163 "New Jerseyization" provides a perfect example of this Sisyphean process. ld "Hard structures
are now present along nearly 80 percent of [New Jersey]'s coastline." Id.
164 See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-20
(2006); National Flood Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-129.
165 Rudolf et al., supra note 35.
166 Byrne & Grannis, supra note 159, at 269. The cost also includes the loss of significant property
tax revenues local governments receive, which themselves fuel continued development. Id. at 270.
167 See KUSLER, supra note 63, at 5 (explaining that governments have been held liable in only a
"small number of cases for nonstructural loss reduction measures ... due to explicit liability exemp-
tions" as well as degree of discretion inherent in some of the measures); see also id. at 51 (providing
recommendations for local governments to avoid liability when making decisions regarding nonstruc-
tural measures).
168 Id. at 11; see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2012)
(discussing the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act).
169 See Adam Liptak, Justices Broaden the Basis for Damages Over Floods, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2012, at A23.
70 See Hunter & Salzman, supra note 86, at 1748 n.32 (quoting Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591
P.2d 719, 722 (Or. 1979)).
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briefly considers the value of legally recognizing a more expansive duty
vis-A-vis climate adaptation and a relaxation of immunity, which stymies
long-standing goals of tort law and provides a shield that aids local gov-
ernments in discrete instances in the short term, but that may ultimately
have the effect of gravely increasing vulnerability to climate change.''
In some circumstances, courts will consider public policy when they
decide whether to hold governments liable for flood damage. 72 Often reso-
lution in these types of cases mirrors the immunity afforded the Army Corp
of Engineers in the recent case of In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litiga-
tion.'73 In its most recent opinion, the Fifth Circuit reversed its earlier ruling
to find that the Discretionary Function Exception to the waiver of sovereign
immunity shielded the Army Corp of Engineers from liability for property
losses suffered by landowners occupying lands adjacent to the infrastruc-
ture Hurricane Katrina compromised.'74 The Discretionary Function Excep-
tion under the Federal Tort Claims Act bars lawsuits on the claims that are
"'based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused."" 75 This stark reversal from the court's earlier opinion suggests that
policy may well have been at play during adjudication as well.'76 On the one
hand, crushing liability is a formidable argument for finding no liability. On
the other hand, and in light of climate-change impacts, deterring and pun-
ishing conduct resulting in loss of life and property is a significant counter-
point and warrants the highest order of protection in American jurispru-
dence. As James Wilkins argues, "[a]t some point, when the social costs of
allowing development to proceed in harm's way outweighs the deference
afforded to governments in their planning decisions by the law and the
courts, governments will begin to incur liability for their failure to protect
public safety."' 77
171 A full exploration of this last point warrants another article-length discussion. Space does not
allow here, but I attempt to raise a few of the major points.
172 See KUSLER, supra note 63, at 15.
173 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012).
174 ld. at 45 1.
175 Id. at 448-49 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006)).
176 For one perspective on the rule, see generally Robert Verchick, Fifth Circuit's Reversal on
Katrina Litigation Leaves Flood Victims Gasping for Air, PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBIog.cfm?idBlog=08E 6 2 2 7 7 -9 7 7 3-4 CA] -85E69FD4E5843072
(stating that the reversal could "narrow[] the chances that the government can be held accountable for
even the most pedestrian mistakes").
177 Wilkins, supra note 15, at 497. Decisions like Cootey v. Sun Investment, Inc. in especially
vulnerable places like Hawai'i would not remain good law under Wilkins's persuasive construction of
relative costs. See Cootey v. Sun Inv., 718 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Haw. 1986) (holding that a county govern-
ment was not liable for approving flooded subdivision plans as there was no breach of a duty of care).
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The arguments against greater liability for local governments may be
overstated or, in the alternative, feasible to plan around. The predominant
argument against liability concerns the cost of such liability.'78 Scholars
have argued that these concerns are overstated.'79 This argument does not
weigh the cost of disaster mitigation against the hazard-induced losses that
municipalities might have prevented. In many cases, the latter far outweighs
the former."' This is significant because adaptation litigation, to the extent
that its success relies on expanded liability, would not benefit from bank-
rupting the local governments that need to expend resources on adapting to
climate change. Negligence actions themselves are costly and time consum-
ing for both plaintiffs and defendant municipalities."' It is certainly the
intention of adaptation litigation as contemplated by this Article to inspire
better government planning so as to reduce litigation and instigate sound
adaptation processes. 2 Litigation and court-imposed liability should serve
primarily to provide a more palpable understanding of the financial costs of
failing to adapt.
Litigation might also provide much needed "cover" for well-
intentioned governments that would like to turn their attention to adaptation
but recognize a persistent lack of mandate from the community and politi-
cal will-and concomitant resource support-at the state and federal lev-
el.'83 It would also halt a key component of the "structural bias"' 8" toward
development in increasingly risky areas. Real estate interests are a powerful
lobby in many coastal communities, including New Jersey.'85 In the context
of SLR risks facing New York City's coastline, one policy analyst stated
that "[t]here's a lot of concern about angering developers."' 86 Further, lob-
bying and state campaign finance data suggest great development interests
wield great influence.'87 To the extent that governments enjoy immunity
when they make decisions regarding policy, the law must remain mindful of
178 See City, supra note 64, at 1563-64 (referencing the objection that imposing liability could
make local governments the insurers of private property owners).
179 See, e.g., id.
180 Id. at 1564.
181 For plaintiffs, it is so much so that some researchers have cited the social justice implications of
adaptation litigation. See McDonald, supra note 85, at 22-23 (noting that adaptation laws need to be
designed so as to "not exacerbate existing drivers of social and economic vulnerability"). This is certain-
ly true and would limit claims to wealthier litigants. The deterrent effects of these actions and the prod-
ding to adapt more effectively would, optimistically, benefit all community members. Further, these
claims would be favorable for impact litigants as modeled by the plaintiffs in Native Village of Kivalina
v. ExxonMobil Corp. 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012).
182 See Lachman, supra note 22, at 980.
183 There might also be concern regarding litigation from other property owners who bring takings
claims. See supra note 157; see also Burkett, supra note 1, at 11153 n. 110.
184 City, supra note 64, at 1572.
185 See Rudolf et al., supra note 35.
186 Navarro, supra note 33, at A20.
187 See Rudolph et al., supra note 35.
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the political milieu in which state and local entities and their government
agencies must deliberate.'88 Liability can retard the type of "capture"'8 9 that
allows development considerations to occur in isolation of increasing dan-
gers in flood zones and at the coastline. 90
CONCLUSION
Litigation has great normative power. Adaptation litigation, which
may now be inevitable, may have the power to set enduring, yet constantly
evolving, standards for climate-change adaptation in order to meet the cli-
mate risk. To get into the courtroom, however, the law must recognize that
the foreseeability of a grave risk coupled with myriad and quite compelling
social costs and policy concerns militate in favor of expanded tort duties for
local governments. This is also an opportunity that local communities can-
not afford to miss. The costs of climate impacts-particularly to the most
geographically and socioeconomically vulnerable-will dwarf the costs of
preparing coupled with the value of adaptation's co-benefits. Municipalities
can either pay now or pay dearly later.
188 Lachman, supra note 22, at 971 ("The purposes of municipal liability are to make the injured
party whole and to deter future harmful conduct by the municipality. Municipal liability is not about
governmental units serving as guarantors of the actions of private developers, but rather as guarantors of
their own permitting decisions.").
189 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MCMT.
Sci. 3, 3 (1971) (postulating that "regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit").
190 This is of course also true for development in wildfire "red zones." See, e.g., Kodas, supra note
10 (describing where wildfire-potential forests meet densely populated areas).
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